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CHOICE OF LAW AS GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE LIMITATION 
 
Carlos M. Vázquez* 
  
Among Lea Brilmayer’s many seminal and lasting contributions to 
Conflict of Laws scholarship has been her work calling attention to “the 
interesting pattern of similarities and differences between the problems of 
the application of American law to international disputes and the 
problems of domestic ‘conflict of laws.’” 1  Professor Brilmayer is 
undoubtedly correct in observing that the doctrines have been 
approached by courts and scholars as “methodologically distinct.”2 My 
thesis in this chapter is that these questions are conceptually identical. The 
question whether state law should be applied to a case having contacts 
with other states or nations is conceptually identical to the question 
whether federal law should be applied to a dispute having contacts with 
other nations. Federal extraterritoriality doctrine is well understood to 
address the question whether federal law, properly interpreted, applies to 
a given dispute having links to other nations. In other words, federal 
extraterritoriality doctrine purports to address the geographic scope of 
federal law. Inter-state choice-of law doctrine has long been understood 
to address the same question.3 I argue here that a state’s choice-of-law 
rules operate no less (and no more) as implicit geographic scope 
limitations as do the rules on federal extraterritoriality. If the latter 
determine the forum’s law’s substantive applicability to disputes having 
links to other states or nations, so do the former. 
My claim is conceptual. I do not argue for any particular approach 
to answer the choice of law question. Indeed, my claim is that the choice 
of law issue is properly conceived as identical to the extraterritoriality issue 
no matter which approach to answering the question is adopted. Though 
conceptual, my claim also has practical doctrinal implications. These 
implications are best appreciated by examining the thesis of an influential 
																																								 																				
* Scott K. Ginsberg Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful 
for very helpful comments from Eduardo Álvarez Armas, Lea Brilmayer, Ralf Michaels, 
Alex Mills, Horatia Muir Watt, Kermit Roosevelt III, and Celia Wasserstein Fassberg. These 
reflections were inspired by Lea Brilmayer’s pathbreaking work on the relationship between 
state choice of law and federal extraterritoriality. 
1  Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and 
Constitutional Appraisal, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 11 (1987). 
2 Id. 
3 By using the term “geographic scope,” I do not mean to suggest that the applicability of 
a law to disputes having connections with other states necessarily turns on the place where 
certain events occurred. The law’s applicability may turn instead on other sorts of 
connections with other states or nations, such as the place of habitual residence of some of 
the parties. 
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group of scholars who have articulated a “two-step” approach to choice 
of law.4 The claims of the two-step theorists are of particular current 
interest because this theory supplies the theoretical foundation for the 
current draft of the American Law Institute’s Third Restatement of 
Conflict of Laws.5 According to the two-step theory, choice-of-law rules 
that function as geographic scope limitations are binding on the courts of 
other states. Thus, if a state has enacted a law but limits its scope to cases 
having a specified connection to the state—such as cases in which the 
injured party is a state resident or the conduct that gave rise to the injury 
occurred in the state—the state’s law, properly interpreted, does not 
extend to cases beyond the specified scope. It follows that another state 
purporting to apply that state’s law commits an error when it applies the 
law beyond its geographic scope. 6  This is true whether the scope 
limitation is contained in express statutory language or is inferred through 
its choice-of law rules. In other words, according to the two-step theory, 
the forum’s courts, in deciding whether to apply the local law of another 
state, 7  must engage in renvoi, at least for the purpose of determining 
whether the law of the other state extends to the case at hand.8 
But, according to the two-step theorists, not all choice-of-law rules 
function as geographic scope limitations. Some function instead as “rules 
of priority.” The forum’s rules of priority tell the courts which state’s law 
should be applied when more than one state’s laws extend to the case. The 
two-step theorists maintain that rules of priority do not operate as scope 
limitations, even when they instruct the forum’s courts to apply a law 
other than its own. Because rules of priority do not function as scope 
limitations, they do not bind the courts of other states. 
This Chapter argues that all choice-of-law rules—even the rules 
that the two-step theorists denominate rules of priority—operate equally 
as geographic scope limitations when they lead to non-application of the 
																																								 																				
4 The principal texts are Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi, The Bewitchment of Our 
Intelligence by Means of Language, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1821 (2005); Larry Kramer, 
The Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 979 (1991). 
5 Professor Roosevelt is the chief reporter of the Third Restatement of Conflict of Laws. 
6 See Larry Kramer, The Myth of the Unprovided-For Case, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 1052 
(1989) (“Rights that can be enforced in court do not exist in the abstract. Courts only 
enforce rights that are conferred by positive law.”). 
7 A state’s “local law” is the law that a state would apply to a case lacking foreign elements— 
that is, a case in which all of the parties are from the state and all events occurred within 
the state. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 8, cmt. d (Am Law Inst. 1971), 
especially the accompanying illustration: “If the X court decides that the reference is to Y 
local law, it will decide the case in the same way as a Y court would have decided if A had 
been a Y national and if all other relevant contacts had been located in Y….” Id. Thus, the 
term “local law” refers to a state’s law shorn of its geographic scope limitations. 
8 On whether this constitutes renvoi, see infra note 29. 
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enacting state’s law.9 Thus, if we accept the two-step theorists’ claim that 
some choice of law rules operate as geographic scope limitations, and if 
we also accept their claim that choice of law rules that operate as 
geographic scope limitations are binding on the courts of other states, 
then (I argue here) the courts must apply all of the choice-of-law rules of 
the other relevant states in order to determine whether the other state’s 
laws extend to the case at hand. If the enacting state’s choice of law 
rules—even its rules of priority—would lead that state’s courts not to 
apply its own law, then sister states would be prohibited from applying 
that law as well. 
On the other hand, I question the two-step theorists’ claim that 
“rules of scope” should be binding on the courts of other states. This 
claim rests on an unsound analogy between rules of scope (as two-step 
theorists understand the concept) and what I call “internal” scope 
limitations. Unlike internal scope limitations, what the two-step theorists 
call rules of scope do not necessarily reflect the enacting state’s preference 
that its law not be applied beyond its specified scope. Rather, such rules, 
even if framed as geographic scope limitations, are ordinarily based on the 
enacting state’s deference to the legislative authority of other states. To 
the extent the enacting state has limited the scope of its law out of 
deference to the legislative authority of other states, other states should 
be free to decline such deference if, under their own choice-of law rules, 
the local law of the enacting state should be applied. 
The latter conclusion, in turn, leads me to question whether choice 
of law rules—whether they be “rules of scope” (in the parlance of the 
two-step theorists) or “rules of priority”—function as scope limitations at 
all. If a state’s choice of law rules tells us that the enacting state’s local law 
does not extend to a particular case having foreign elements, then it does 
seem to follow that the courts of another state commit an error when they 
resolve the dispute by applying that state’s local law. If other states are 
free to resolve disputes by using such law, then it would seem to follow 
that the enacting state’s choice of law rules do not in fact limit the scope 
of that law—they do not tell us that such law simply does not extend to 
this case. My claim about the nature of “geographic scope limitations” 
thus calls into question whether choice of law rules—including the rules 
of federal extraterritoriality doctrine and, indeed, statutory provisions 
																																								 																				
9 To the extent a given state’s choice-of-law rules identify which other state’s law should be 
applied, when more than two are in contention, they do more than specify the geographic 
scope of that state’s law. This is concededly one respect in which state’s choice of law rules 
differ from federal extraterritoriality doctrine. But, if the state’s choice of law rules identify 
another state’s law as applicable, these rules simultaneously tell us that that state’s law does 
not extend to the case. 
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expressly framed as geographic scope limitations— should be understood 
as scope limitations at all.  
This Chapter begins by examining how the Supreme Court (“the 
Court”) conceptualizes federal extraterritoriality doctrine. It then shows 
that a state’s choice-of-law rules have long been conceptualized in the 
same way: as implicit limits on the territorial reach of the state’s laws. I 
then discuss the two-step theory’s rationale for regarding only some 
choice-of-law rules as geographic scope limitations and show that the 
rules that the two-step theorists call “rules of priority” function as 
geographic scope limitations just as much as do the rules that the two-step 
theorists call “rules of scope” (at least when they lead the enacting state’s 
courts to apply a law other than its own). I then argue, however, that, 
unlike internal scope limitations, rules of (geographic) scope (as the two-
step theorists understand the term) should not always bind the courts of 
sister states. 10  The final section of the Chapter considers whether a 
restriction that is binding on the enacting state’s courts but not the courts 
of sister states can properly be understood as a substantive limitation on 
the reach of the enacting state’s law—that is, as a scope limitation. 
1. Federal Extraterritoriality Doctrine 
Today the Supreme Court clearly understands federal 
extraterritoriality doctrine as determining the proper interpretation of 
federal law with respect to its geographic scope. The Court’s clearest 
recent articulation of this view came in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 
Ltd.11 The plaintiffs in Morrison asserted a claim for relief under section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 based on conduct that 
occurred in part outside the territory of the United States. The Court 
clearly viewed the question whether the Act should be applied by the court 
as a question about “what conduct § 10(b) reaches,” which, the Court 
made clear, “is a merits question.”12 The Court thus rejected the lower 
court’s conceptualization of the issue as one of jurisdiction. Before 
Morrison, the Court had sometimes treated the issue differently. In Hartford 
Fire Insurance Co. v. California, for example, the Court treated the question 
as whether the court should refrain from applying a concededly applicable 
law out of deference to the interests of other nations.13 Justice Scalia, the 
																																								 																				
10 To be clear, I am not arguing that state should be prohibited from considering another 
state’s geographic scope limitation. For example, a state that employs governmental interest 
analysis may reasonably regard another state’s geographic scope limitation as indicative of 
the strength of its interest in having its law applied to particular cases having foreign 
elements. I am merely arguing that states need not regard other states’ geographic scope 
limitations as binding. 
11 Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
12 Id. at 254. 
13 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797–98 (1993). 
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author of Morrison, had dissented in Hartford Fire, chiding the majority for 
misconceiving the issue. 14  Since Morrison, the court has consistently 
understood the extraterritoriality question as determining whether the 
federal law involved, properly construed, extends to the case at hand.15 
The Court’s conceptualization of this issue as involving the proper 
construction of the statute with respect to its geographic scope was not a 
new one (although Hartford Fire illustrates that the Court sometimes 
strayed from this understanding). The Court has long conceived of the 
extraterritoriality issue as requiring a determination of a statute’s 
geographic scope. As the Court noted in Lauritzen v. Larsen, Congress 
typically writes statutes in broad, all-encompassing terms. Read literally, 
such general laws would be applicable no matter where the conduct 
occurred or where the parties were from. Unless some limitation were 
read into them, generally-worded laws would apply to the conduct of 
every person in the world anywhere in the world—“a hand on a Chinese 
junk, never outside Chinese waters, would not be beyond [the law’s] literal 
wording.”16  
The Court’s extraterritoriality doctrine instructs that generally-
worded statutes are not to be read literally. This does not mean that the 
courts are defying Congress’ wishes. To the contrary, as stated by Judge 
Hand in the oft-cited Alcoa decision, “the only question open is whether 
Congress intended to impose liability and whether our own Constitution 
permitted it to do so: as a court of the United States we cannot look 
beyond our own law.” 17  Thus, if Congress has clearly addressed the 
question of geographic scope, the courts are obligated to enforce the 
statute as written (subject to constitutional constraints). But, in the 
absence of express language addressing the question of geographic scope, 
the courts assume that Congress legislated with only the purely domestic 
case in mind, leaving the question of territorial scope to the courts. The 
Court has, in turn, developed a general rule to address this question. This 
rule operates as a “canon of construction … whereby unexpressed 
congressional intent may be ascertained,”18—that is, as “a presumption 
about a statute’s meaning.”19  The purpose of this rule is “to protect 
against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations 
which could result in international discord.”20 It reflects the assumption 
																																								 																				
14 See id. at 813–820 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
15 See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2099–100 (2016); Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115 (2013). 
16 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577 (1953). 
17 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). 
18 E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley 
Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). 
19 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255. 
20 Aramco, 336 U.S. at 248. 
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that, unless it clearly stated otherwise, Congress did not intend to “rule 
the world.”21  
In Morrison, the Court adopted the presumption against 
extraterritoriality as the rule the courts should ordinarily apply in 
determining the geographic scope of federal statutes. But the Court’s 
conceptualization of the issue as one of geographic scope is entirely 
independent of the particular approach the Court employs to answer the 
question. Thus, in Lauritzen v. Larsen, the Court applied a very different 
approach to determine the geographic scope of the Jones Act, yet it 
conceptualized the issue, as it did in Morrison, as “a question of statutory 
construction rather commonplace in a federal system.”22 
Thus, as understood by the Court, the rules the Court applies to 
determine federal extraterritoriality function as implicit geographic scope 
limitations. Today, the Court favors the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, but with respect to some statutes the Court has 
employed, and continues to employ, quite different approaches. 23 
Regardless of the particular approach used, the relevant rules are 
understood to function as implicit limits on the scope of federal statutes, 
to be employed unless Congress has expressly addressed the issue. 
2. State Choice-of-Law Rules as Geographic Scope Limitations 
State choice-of-law rules have also long been understood as 
implicitly delineating the geographic scope of forum law. As with federal 
extraterritoriality doctrine, the province of choice-of-law rules has long 
been understood to be to define the territorial scope of a state’s law in the 
absence of explicit legislative guidance on the question. Judge Hand in 
Alcoa explicitly recognized the conceptual similarity when he noted, in a 
federal extraterritoriality case, that “we are not to read general words [in a 
federal statute] without regard to the limitations … which generally 
correspond to those fixed by the ‘Conflict of Laws.’” 24  Unless the 
legislature specifically addresses the statute’s geographic scope, the courts 
assume that the legislature intended the law to extend only to those cases 
to which the law would extend under prevailing choice-of law rules.  
The famous decision of the Alabama Supreme Court in Alabama 
Great Southern Railroad v. Carroll well illustrates how the courts understood 
the function of choice-of-law rules under the traditional approach to 
																																								 																				
21 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 
(2007)). 
22 Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 578. 
23 See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
24 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443. See also Justice Holmes’ opinion in American Banana Co. v. 
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), a federal extraterritoriality case that relies on such 
Conflict of Laws chestnuts as Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878). 
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choice of law reflected in the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws.25 
Carroll involved an injury suffered by an employee of a railroad as a result 
of the negligence of another employee. Under the common-law fellow 
servant rule, an employer was not liable for injuries suffered by one 
employee as a result of the negligence of another employee. The Alabama 
legislature had repealed that rule by statute, but the legislature had not 
specified the territorial scope of the statute. The court held that the statute 
should be understood to incorporate the traditional lex loci delicti choice-
of-law rule, under which tort cases are governed by the law of the state in 
which the injury occurred. As the court wrote, “Section 2590 of the Code 
… is to be interpreted in the light of universally recognized principles of 
private international or interstate law, as if its operation had been expressly 
limited to this State and as if its first line read as follows: ‘When a personal 
injury is received in Alabama by a servant or employee,’ etc.”26 
Alabama’s choice of law rule—lex loci delicti—thus functioned as an 
implicit limitation on the geographic scope of the Alabama statute. At the 
same time, the lex loci delicti rule instructed the Alabama courts to apply 
the law of the place of injury, which in this case was Mississippi. Because 
Mississippi’s substantive law was the fellow-servant rule, the court ruled 
against the plaintiff. If the Alabama legislature had instead specified that 
its statute repealing the fellow-servant rule applied whenever the 
employer-employee relationship was centered in Alabama, or when the 
conduct causing the injury occurred in Alabama, the court would 
presumably have concluded that the statute extended to the case and 
would have ruled the other way.27 As the Carroll opinion appeared to 
recognize, the courts of a state will follow the directives of the state’s 
legislature regarding the territorial scope of the state’s statutes (and other 
laws). In the absence of such directives, however, the court will assume 
that the legislature did not address the statute’s territorial scope when 
enacting a statute. Instead, the court assumes that the statute reflects the 
legislature’s preferences with respect to the purely domestic case—in 
which all of the parties and all of the events occurred within the state—
and meant to leave the question of extraterritorial scope to be governed 
by prevailing choice-of law rules. The court accordingly applies the 
prevailing choice-of-law rules as reflecting the legislature’s (implicit) 
																																								 																				
25 Alabama Great Southern Railroad v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126 (1892). 
26 Id. at 134. 
27 I say “presumably” because the U.S. Supreme Court during that era appeared in some 
cases to regard the traditional choice-of-law rules reflected in the First Restatement of 
Conflict of Laws to be constitutionally required. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. v. Dodge, 
246 U.S. 357 (1918). The Court today emphatically does not. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
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preferences regarding the territorial reach of the statutes it enacts (as well 
as of substantive common law rules).28 
3. The Two-Step Theory 
Although the proposition that choice-of-law rules implicitly limit 
the geographic scope of forum law has a long pedigree, this 
conceptualization of choice-of-law rules has only been partially embraced 
by scholars. Nor has the proposition that conceptualizing choice-of-law 
rules as scope limitations requires the courts to engage in renvoi been 
widely embraced. But the latter proposition has been forcefully advanced 
recently by scholars who have developed a “two-step” approach to choice 
of law. The draft Third Restatement operationalizes this theory by 
providing that, when the forum court applies the law of another state, it 
must give effect to the law’s geographic scope restrictions. 29  Indeed, 
according to the draft Third Restatement, a court would be violating the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution if it applied the law 
of a sister state without giving effect to its geographic scope limitations.30 
These same scholars, however, maintain that only some choice of law 
rules function as geographic scope limitations.  
In this Part, I examine the two foregoing claims of the two-step 
theorists. First, I examine the claim that “rules of scope” function as 
																																								 																				
28 Mississippi at the time also adhered to the lex loci delicti rule, so according to Mississippi’s 
implicit geographic scope limitation, its law applied to the case. Under the First 
Restatement’s approach to renvoi, whether Mississippi would also apply its own law would 
not have mattered. Under the two-step theory, discussed below, the Alabama court would 
not apply Mississippi law if Mississippi had engrafted a geographic scope limitation 
rendering it inapplicable. Whether the Alabama courts should treat Mississippi’s geographic 
scope limitation as binding in this context is discussed in Part 3.2, below. 
29 The Third Restatement achieves this result indirectly by, first, defining “internal law” as 
including geographic scope limitations, see Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws § 1.03 
cmt. a (Am. Law. Inst., Council Draft No. 2, 2017) and then providing in § 5.05(1) that, 
“[w]hen directed by its own choice-of-law rule to apply the law of any state, the forum 
applies the internal law of that state …” Section 5.05(2) permits the forum under limited 
circumstances to apply a sister state’s choice-of-law rules (defined to exclude geographic 
scope limitations, see infra note 31), but § 5.05(1) requires the forum to apply its sister 
states’ geographic scope limitations whenever it applies the state’s substantive law. 
30 See Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws § 5.02 Reporters’ note (Am. Law. Inst., 
Council Draft No. 2, 2017) (“A state court applying another State’s statute to a set of facts 
outside its specified scope would violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause, if the scope 
restriction is clear and brought to the court’s attention.”). Although this reporters’ note 
refers only to statutory scope restrictions, the Third Restatement’s reasoning appears to 
require the same conclusion for the scope restrictions read into a statute by the enacting 
states’ courts as well as for geographic scope limitations read into a sister state’s non-
statutory law by the sister state’s courts. See § 5.01 cmt. c (“The scope of foreign internal 
law is a question of foreign law…. It is determined in light of how the foreign law is 
understood and applied in the foreign jurisdiction … The forum accepts authoritative 
statements from foreign states as to the scope of their law.”). 
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geographic scope limitations but “rules of priority” do not. I argue that 
the better view is that the latter rules function no less as geographic scope 
limitations than do the former. Second, I examine the two-step theorists’ 
claim that choice-of-law rules that function as geographic scope 
limitations must be applied by sister states—in other words, that 
conceptualizing choice of law rules as scope limitations means that the 
courts of one state must engage in renvoi in order to determine that the 
laws of their sister states purport to apply to the case at hand.31 I argue 
																																								 																				
31 The draft Third Restatement distinguishes between geographic scope limitations and 
choice-of-law rules, and reserves and latter term for what its chief reporter has called “rules 
of priority.” See Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws § 1.03 (Am. Law. Inst., Council 
Draft No. 2, 2017) (defining “internal law” as “a state’s law exclusive of its rules of choice 
of law”); id. cmt. a (stating that “[i]nternal law, as defined here, includes restrictions the law 
places on the persons who may assert rights under the law or the geographic scope of the 
law”). Professor Kramer, for his part, understands the term “choice-of-law rule” to embrace 
both geographic scope limitations and rules of priority. See Kramer, supra note 2, at 1005 
(“[B]ecause choice of law is a process of interpreting laws to determine their applicability 
on the facts of a particular case, the forum can never ignore other states’ choice of law 
systems—whether these consist of ad hoc decisions, functional rules, or jurisdiction-
selecting rules of the First Restatement variety. On the contrary, the applicability of another 
state’s law must be determined in light of its choice-of-law system. Hence, a proper 
understanding of choice of law means the return of the renvoi.”); id. at 1011 (“A state’s 
approach to choice of law by definition establishes the state’s rules of interpretation for 
questions of extraterritorial scope.” (emphasis in original)); id. at 1012 (“Like it or not, and 
however foolish they may seem, traditional choice-of-law rules are intended to limit the 
scope and meaning of substantive law … [T]hey reflect state’s decisions about how far to 
extend local law in multistate cases.”). In my view, Professor Kramer’s usage is the more 
conventional one and I employ it here. See also Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law: 
The Oxford Commentaries on American Law 494 (2016) (“Despite their location in 
substantive statutes (and despite their variations in content and wording), all of these 
localizing provisions qualify as choice-of-law rules, albeit of the unilateral type.”).  
The draft Third Restatement purports to be rejecting renvoi to the same extent as 
the Second Restatement (which rejected renvoi in most circumstances). The former provides 
that, when directed by their choice-of-law rules to apply the law of a given state, courts are 
ordinarily to apply the “internal law” of that state, whereas the latter provides that, in such 
circumstances, the courts are ordinarily to apply “local law” of that state. Compare 
Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws § 5.05(a) (Am. Law. Inst., Council Draft No. 2, 
2017) with Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 8(a) (1977). However, the Third 
Restatement’s definition of “internal law” differs fundamentally from the Second 
Restatement’s definition of “local law”. The current draft of the Third Restatement defines 
the term “internal law” as a state’s substantive law as limited by the state’s geographic scope 
limitations. See Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws § 1.03 cmt. a (Am. Law. Inst., 
Council Draft No. 2, 2017). Thus, the Third Restatement contemplates that the forum will 
apply the geographic scope limitation of the other state’s law, while the Second Restatement 
contemplates that the forum will ordinarily apply the law a state would apply in a case having 
no foreign elements. See supra note 7.  Under the Second Restatement’s conception of what 
counts as a “conflict of laws rule,” applying another state’s geographic scope limitation 
would count as renvoi. Professor Kramer appears to agree with the Second Restatement, and 
to diverge from the draft Third Restatement on this terminological point, as he argues that 
the two-step theory requires the courts to “accept the renvoi.” See Kramer, supra note 4, at 
983, 1030. 
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that, because of the nature of these limitations, the courts of one state 
should be regarded as free to apply a sister state’s substantive law even if 
that state’s courts would not apply that law because of the geographic 
scope limitation. 
3.1. Which Choice-of-Law Rules Function as Geographic Scope 
Limitations? 
The two-step theory distinguishes between choice-of-law rules that 
function as geographic scope limitations and choice-of-law rules that 
function as rules of priority. According to the two-step theory, a choice-
of-law rule that functions as a geographic scope limitation defines the 
territorial scope of a law and must be treated by the courts of other states 
as a binding interpretation of the reach of the underlying substantive law. 
Rules of priority, however, are not geographic scope limitations and sister 
states are not bound to give them effect. I examine the claim that 
geographic scope limitations must be given effect by sister state courts in 
section 3.1.2. First, in this section, I question the two-step theorists’ claim 
that rules of scope function as geographic scope limitations but rules of 
priority do not. 
3.1.1 The Distinction between Rules of Scope and Rules of Priority 
The two-step theory is a refinement of governmental interest 
analysis. To understand the two-step theory’s distinction between rules of 
scope and rules of priority, it is useful to begin by explaining the basic 
analytical approach of governmental interest analysis and certain concepts 
introduced by Brainerd Currie. Professor Currie’s fundamental insight was 
that not all disputes that involve states having different substantive laws 
pose true conflicts.32 It may be that only one of the states has an interest 
in having its law applied to the dispute. If so, the dispute presents a “false 
conflict,” and the law of the only interested state should be applied. If 
both states have an interest in having their law applied, the dispute 
presents a true conflict. For such cases, Currie initially advocated that the 
forum should apply its own law, on the theory that weighing the 
conflicting state policies to determine which state had a greater interest is 
not an appropriate role for courts. Currie’s approach to resolving true 
conflicts found less favor among courts and commentators than his 
identification of false conflicts. As discussed below, he later modified his 
approach to true conflicts, and other scholars have proposed alternative 
approaches for resolving true conflicts.  
																																								 																				
32 See Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws: Foundations and Future Directions 70 (1990) (“It 
has often been remarked that the biggest success of Currie’s scheme was the identification 
of false conflicts.”). Professor Brilmayer, I should add, does not agree with this assessment. 
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Of greater significance to the present discussion is Currie’s 
approach to determining whether a state has an interest in having its law 
applied. Currie argued that this question should be approached as a 
question of statutory interpretation. In the purely domestic case, the court 
must interpret the statute to determine whether it applies to certain 
marginal domestic circumstances (for example, does a statute prohibiting 
vehicles in the park apply to bicycles?). Currie argued that determining 
whether the state has an interest in having its law applied to a case having 
foreign elements is basically the same problem, and it should be 
approached in the same way—by applying ordinary rules of statutory 
interpretation. 33  The court should “try[] to decide [the question of 
whether the state has an interest in having its law applied to a particular 
case] as it believes [the legislature] would have decided had it foreseen the 
problem.”34 Thus, he argued, the courts should seek to determine the 
purpose of the statute and should conclude that the state has an interest 
in having its law applied to a case if the statute’s purposes would be 
advanced by applying it to the case. For present purposes, Currie’s 
purposive approach to statutory interpretation is less important than his 
idea that this aspect of the choice of law process should be approached as 
a matter of statutory interpretation aimed at determining the reach of each 
state’s law.  
As noted, Currie’s solution to true conflicts has not been widely 
embraced by courts and commentators.35 Other scholars have accepted 
Currie’s basic insights but rejected his conclusion that the forum state 
should always apply its own law if the law’s purposes would be advanced. 
Professor William Baxter, for example, argued that, in true conflict cases, 
courts should apply the law of the state whose policies would be most 
impaired if not applied.36 Professor Joseph Singer has proposed that, in 
cases presenting real conflicts, forum law should be displaced when 
applying it would “significantly interfere with the ability of another state 
																																								 																				
33 See Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson—A Recent Development in 
Conflicts of Laws, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1233, 1242 (1963). 
34 Brainerd Currie, The Verdict of the Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 
28 U. Chi L. Rev. 258, 277 (1961). The appropriate approach to interpreting statutes is of 
course contestable. Currie’s purposivist approach to statutory interpretation has fallen out 
of favor in certain circles, and the Supreme Court expressly rejected it in the federal 
extraterritoriality context. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261 (rejecting an approach that seeks 
to “divin[e] what Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation before the 
court” as “judicial-speculation-made-law” and adopting instead the presumption against 
extraterritoriality). 
35 Currie himself later modified his view, proposing that, “[i]f the court finds an apparent 
conflict between the interest of the two states,” it should consider whether the conflict 
might be avoided through a “more moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy of 
interest of one state or the other.” Currie, supra note 33, at 1242. 
36 William Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1963). 
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to constitute itself as a normative and political community and the 
relationship between the forum and the dispute is such that the forum 
should defer to the internal norms of the foreign normative 
community.” 37  The Second Restatement adopted a different rule: 
application of the law of the state with the “most significant relationship” 
to the dispute.38  
The two-step theory builds upon Currie’s insights. The first step 
of the two-step analysis corresponds to the initial determination of 
whether the purposes of a state’s law would be advanced if applied to the 
case at hand. Like Currie, the two-step theorists conceptualize this step as 
a determination of the geographic scope of the state’s law, properly treated 
as a matter of statutory interpretation. The second step of the two-step 
analysis consists of the analyses the courts employ to determine which law 
to apply if, in the first step, the court determines that more than one states’ 
laws extend to the case. In the parlance of the two-step theory, the rules 
that courts apply in this second step are “rules of priority.”39 A given 
state’s rule of priority might be “always apply forum law” (Currie’s initial 
approach) or “apply the law whose purposes would be most impaired if 
not applied (Baxter’s approach) or “apply the law of the state with the 
most significant relation to the dispute” (the Second Restatement’s 
approach).  
Scholars have criticized Currie’s approach to both the first and the 
second steps. 40  Two-step theorists are agnostic as to the particular 
approach a court should use at both the first and the second steps.41 But 
																																								 																				
37 Joseph Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 70 (1989). Professor Singer’s concept of 
a “real conflict” differs somewhat from Currie’s concept of a “true conflict.” 
38 The Second Restatement does not explicitly set forth the “most significant relationship” 
test as a mechanism for resolving true conflicts. Nevertheless, there is some basis in the 
Second Restatement for approaching the test in this manner, and some courts have done 
so. See, e.g., Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 995 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Mont. 2000). See also 
Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws, ch. 5, topic 1, intro., at 110 (Am. Law. Inst., 
Council Draft No. 2, 2017) (“Pennsylvania, and until recently New Jersey, use the 
Restatement Second’s ‘most significant relationship’ [test] to resolve [true] conflicts.”). 
39 See Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 1874–87. 
40 With respect to the first step, scholars have questioned, among other things, Currie’s 
assumption that a state would deem its law applicable only if it would operate in favor of a 
state resident or domiciliary. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State’s Interest 
in Protecting Its Own, 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 173 (1981). Indeed, scholars have questioned 
whether the spatial scope of statutes can be deduced by reference to their underlying 
policies. See T. De Boer, Beyond Lex Loci Delicti: Conflicts Methodology and Multistate 
Torts in American Case Law 426, 439 (1987); Brilmayer, supra note 32, at 54. 
41 See Kermit Roosevelt III & Bethan Jones, What a Third Restatement of Conflict of Laws 
Can Do, 110 Am. J. Int’l L. Unbound 139, 143 n. 19 (2016) (“[W]hile we agree with Currie 
that determining scope is a matter of interpreting law, we do not necessarily agree with the 
interpretations he suggested … The Restatement draft does not follow Currie’s assump 
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they insist that the choice-of-law process consists of these two steps. And, 
most importantly for present purposes, they insist that the point of the 
first step—and only the first step—is to determine the geographic scope 
of the relevant laws. The court in the first step is interpreting the reach of 
its state’s law to a case having foreign elements. A state court’s 
interpretation of its own law’s geographic scope is the equivalent of its 
interpretation of the law’s applicability to certain marginal domestic 
situations. Indeed, a state court’s determination in the first step that the 
law extends to cases having particular connections to the state is the 
equivalent of the state legislature’s specification that the law applies in 
marginal domestic cases.42 
According to two-step theorists, the second step—which is 
governed by “rules of priority”—is very different. The key difference 
between the rules applied in the two steps is reflected in the very different 
effect the enacting state’s courts’ resolution of the two steps has for the 
courts of other states. Because, in the first step, a state’s court determines 
the geographic scope of its own law, the court’s decision is binding on 
sister state courts to the extent the decision is that the law does not extend 
to the case.43 But, when a state’s courts apply that state’s rules of priority 
and conclude that another state’s law should be applied instead of its own, 
they are not, in the view of the two-step theorists, determining the 
geographic scope of their own law. Because a rule of priority does not 
determine geographic scope, a state court’s application of such a rule is 
not binding on other states.  
3.1.2 Rules of Priority as Rules of Scope 
My claim is that, properly understood, a state’s step-two rules 
operate no less as geographic scope limitations than do its step-one rules. 
The first step of Currie’s choice-of-law inquiry asks whether the policy 
underlying a state’s law would be advanced if applied to the case; if it 
would not be, the underlying law does not extend to the case. Professor 
Currie took the position that, if the policies underlying the state’s law 
would be advanced, the state’s law does extend to the case. He was of the 
view that a state’s courts should always apply forum law when the state’s 
policies would be advanced by doing so. For courts and scholars who 
reject Professor Currie’s (initial) solution for true conflicts, however, the 
inquiry did not end there. These scholars have articulated a variety of 
																																								 																				
tions about state interests or his conclusions as to the scope of state laws, much less his 
views on how to resolve conflicts between them.”). 
42 See Roosevelt, supra note 4, at 1860. 
43 To the extent the state’s geographic scope limitations establish that the state’s law does 
extend to the case at hand, these rules authoritatively determine the reach of the other state’s 
law, but other states are free to apply their own law (or the law of a third state) pursuant to 
its rules of priority. 
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alternative approaches for determining which law to apply in true conflict 
situations. As put forward by these scholars, these rules function no less 
as geographic scope limitations. When these rules yield the conclusion that 
another states’ law should be applied to the case, they are telling us that, 
despite the state’s apparent interest in having its law applied to the dispute, 
the state’s law does not actually extend to the dispute.  
The alternative view treating only the rules applied at the first step 
as scope limitations would regard a state court’s decision at the second 
step not to apply forum law as a decision to decline to enforce a law of its 
own state that, properly interpreted, extends to the case at hand. This 
conceptualization raises questions about the proper role of courts in a 
legal system. Professor Currie believed that it was the role of courts in a 
legal system to apply that system’s positive law whenever it applied; the 
only proper basis for declining to apply that law is that the law does not 
purport to apply. His views on this point have a venerable pedigree. It is 
widely understood that the courts of a state have an obligation to enforce 
legislation enacted by the state’s legislature (to the extent it is valid) in 
cases within their jurisdiction. “There is one rule or policy which, 
wherever applicable, takes precedence over others … That controlling 
policy, obvious as it may be, is that a court must follow the dictates of its 
own legislature to the extent these are constitutional.”44 The two-step 
theorists’ claim that a court’s step-two decision to apply another state’s 
law is a decision not to enforce its own state’s concededly applicable 
statute violates that “obvious” “controlling policy.”  
As noted, legislatures typically write laws in general terms; if read 
literally the laws would extend to conduct performed anywhere in the 
world by anyone in the world. Of course, forum courts do not apply these 
laws as written; they apply the forum’s choice-of-law rules and, pursuant 
to such rules, they sometimes apply the substantive law of a different state 
instead. But, when they do so, they do not purport to be defying the will 
of their own legislature. Rather, as the analysis in the Carroll case shows, 
they assume that the legislature did not focus on the statute’s geographic 
scope, and they treat the issue as subject to judicial interpretation. In First 
Restatement states, the courts assume that the legislature intended the 
statute to be consistent with traditional rules of conflict of laws. Thus, as 
the court stated in Carroll, statutes addressing tort cases should be 
construed to apply when the injury occurred in the state’s territory. States 
that have rejected the First Restatement approach have adopted 
alternative ways of construing the statutes’ geographic scope in the face 
																																								 																				
44 Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at n. 7 (1953) (quoting Elliott E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, 
Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 959, 961 (1952)). Judge Hand expressed 
a similar view in Alcoa; see text accompanying note 15. 
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of legislative silence. But, in both situations, the relevant choice-of-law 
rules are understood to function, for forum courts, as implicit limitations 
on the geographic reach of forum law. When a court determines that the 
forum’s choice-of-law rule requires application of another state’s law, 
either at the first or the second step, it does not refuse to apply forum law 
that extends to the case; rather, it decides that forum law does not extend 
to the case.  
The analyses of Professor Currie and subsequent governmental 
interest analysts are consistent with this conceptualization. As discussed 
above, Professor Currie’s initial view was that, if the policies underlying 
the forum state’s law would be advanced if applied to the case, the forum 
state’s courts should always apply forum law (subject to constitutional 
limitations). This conclusion followed from a combination of two distinct 
propositions embraced by Professor Currie. First, he insisted that, if the 
forum state’s law extends to the case, it is the duty of the state’s courts to 
apply that law (subject to constitutional limitations). There is no legitimate 
basis (other than constitutional limits) for a state’s courts to decline to 
apply a law that the state’s legislature has enacted and that, correctly 
interpreted, applies to the case. But that leaves open the second question: 
whether the law extends to the case. 
To answer this question, Professor Currie argued that, if the 
legislature has not addressed it, courts should ask if the substantive 
purposes underlying the forum state’s law would be advanced if applied 
to the case. An affirmative answer, in his view, means that the law, 
properly interpreted, extends to the case. This is the question the courts 
address in step one. Professor Currie concluded that Step One fully 
answers the question of geographic scope because he did not believe that 
courts could legitimately weigh the forum state’s interest in advancing its 
policies through application of forum law against another state’s interest 
in advancing its policies through application of its law. Thus, the forum 
court’s determination that the policies underlying the forum’s law would 
be advanced if the law were applied to the case ended the choice-of-law 
analysis because he believed both that (a) a state’s courts must apply forum 
law if forum law extends to the case, and (b) whether forum law extends 
to the case depends entirely on whether the policies underlying that law 
would be advanced if the law were applied to the case.  
The scholars who disagreed with Professor Currie’s approach to 
resolving true conflicts did not dispute his premise that a state’s courts are 
obligated to apply forum law if forum law, properly interpreted, extends 
to the case. Instead, they disagreed with Currie’s conclusion that the 
forum’s law extends to the case as long as its purposes would be advanced 
if applied to the case. Professor Baxter’s analysis is instructive. He entirely 
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agreed with Currie’s analysis except for his conclusion that a law should 
be deemed applicable as long as any of its purposes would be advanced to 
any extent if applied to the case.45 He even agreed with Currie’s view that 
courts should not weigh the governmental interests reflected in the 
contending local laws.46 But he argued that courts could legitimately assess 
the extent to which each state’s law would be impaired if not applied. In 
his view, the interests of all states would be maximized if all states applied 
the law whose policies would be most impaired if not applied to a given 
case.47  
Most importantly for present purposes, Professor Baxter argued 
that, in true conflict situations, each state’s legislature should be presumed 
to have wanted its law to be applied only if the policies underlying its law 
would be more impaired if not applied. 48  Thus, Professor Baxter 
proposed “comparative impairment” analysis as an alternative way to 
determine the geographic scope of forum law in true conflict situations.  
Two-step theorists regard the comparative impairment analysis as 
a rule of priority and not a rule of scope. But, as Baxter’s analysis shows, 
a comparative-impairment state’s true rule of scope is more complex than 
the two-step theorists recognize. The rules that state courts employ at the 
first and the second steps are both just parts of the courts’ approach to 
determining the geographic scope of forum law. For a state that adheres 
to Baxter’s comparative impairment approach, the state’s complete rule 
																																								 																				
45 Baxter, supra note 36, at 8–10. 
46 Id. at 18–19. 
47 Id. at 21–22. 
48 Id. at 7–9. Professor Baxter regarded comparative impairment analysis as an extension of 
Currie’s approach to identifying false conflicts, and he defended it on the same grounds. 
“The same analysis by which Currie distinguishes real from false conflicts can resolve real 
conflicts cases. The question ‘Will the social objective underlying the X rule be furthered 
by application of the rule in cases like the present one?’ need not necessarily be answered 
‘Yes’ or ‘No’; the answer will often be, ‘Yes, to some extent.’ The extent to which the 
purpose underlying a rule will be furthered by application or impaired by nonapplication to 
cases of a particular category may be regarded as the measure of the rule’s pertinence and 
of the state’s interest in the rule’s application to cases within that category.” Baxter argued 
that “if the lawmakers of [two states] assembled for interstate negotiations on the scope of 
application of [their] inconsistent rules,” they would agree on application of the law of the 
state whose law would be most impaired if not applied. Although Baxter regarded a 
negotiated agreement adopting comparative impairment to be the preferred solution, see 
id. at 10, he also believed that states should adopt the comparative impairment approach 
even without such an agreement (presumably in the hope that other states would follow 
suit). See id. at 42. See also id. at 10 n. 22. Indeed, he employed the thought experiment 
positing an imaginary assembly of lawmakers to explain the first step of Currie’s govern 
mental interest analysis. See id. at 7–8. He proposed his second step—the comparative 
impairment analysis—as the result the hypothetical assembly of lawmakers would favor to 
resolve true conflicts. Baxter thus conceptualized both steps of the analysis he was 
proposing as aimed at delineating the geographic scope of the relevant state laws. 
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of scope should be understood by the state’s courts to be as follows: “Our 
law applies if the purpose of our law would be advanced if applied to this 
case and if the purpose of our law would be more impaired if not applied 
than would the purposes of another state’s law.” Similarly, for a state that 
uses the Second Restatement’s “more significant relationship” test to 
resolve true conflicts, the state’s rule of scope should be understood as 
follows: “Our law applies if the purposes of our law would be advanced 
if applied to this case and if no other state has a more significant relation 
to the dispute.”  
According to Professor Kramer, the difference between step-one 
rules and step-two rules is that the former are “unilateral” rules while the 
latter are “multilateral.”49 The former are unilateral in that they focus only 
on forum law and the forum state’s interests. 50  Multilateral rules, by 
contrast, require the courts to consider the content of other states’ laws 
and those states’ possible interests in having their law applied. Professor 
Kramer is (largely) correct in distinguishing step-one from step-two rules 
in this way. But the multilateral rules address the question of the scope of 
the forum state’s law no less than the unilateral rules applied in the first 
step. Baxter did not challenge Currie’s claim that a state’s courts had no 
legitimate basis for declining to apply forum law when applicable. He 
merely advocated a more complex approach to determining the scope of 
forum law in the absence of an express legislative resolution of that 
question. Thus, when a court applying the “comparative impairment” 
approach concludes that the purposes of the forum state’s law would be 
advanced if the law were applied to the case but nevertheless decides to 
																																								 																				
49 See Kramer, supra note 4, at 1033. Some rules of priority are not multilateral, however. 
Currie’s rule of priority (always apply forum law) is an example of a unilateral rule of priority. 
50 Even the first step is not purely unilateral, however. As discussed in the next section, all 
choice-of-law rules are multilateral insofar as they reflect deference to the potentially 
superior legislative authority of other states. Additionally, as the first step is usually applied, 
a state’s “interest” in having its law applied depends on the content of the laws of the other 
states connected to the dispute. As noted, the first step in Currie’s analysis is to determine 
if the forum and other potentially interested states have an interest in applying their laws. If 
only one state has an interest, then we have a false conflict and the choice of law analysis 
ends. In determining whether the relevant states have an interest, forum courts do not 
usually look at their laws in isolation. Rather, they focus on how their laws differ from the 
laws of the other relevant states. Thus, in Babcock, the court determined that New York 
had an interest in applying its law to the case only because the other potentially relevant 
law—that of Ontario—would, if applied, operate in a way that would disfavor the injured 
New York resident. Assume that Vermont had a guest statute providing that guests can 
recover against their hosts only if the host was reckless. If the injured party was from 
Vermont and the host was from Ontario, Vermont would have an interest in applying its 
law because the other option—Ontario law—would deny the injured Vermont resident any 
compensation. If the driver was from New York, on the other hand, Vermont would not 
have an interest in applying its law because the other option—New York law—would be 
even more favorable to the injured Vermont resident. 
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apply another state’s law because the policies underlying that state’s law 
would be more impaired if not applied, the court has determined that, 
despite the forum state’s apparent interest in having its law applied, the 
forum state’s law does not extend to this case.  
That multilateral choice of law rules, no less than unilateral ones, 
can function as geographic scope limitations is shown further by the case-
law concerning federal extraterritoriality. As discussed in Part I, there is 
no question that the Court conceives of federal extraterritoriality doctrine 
as addressing the geographic scope of federal law. The Court today favors 
a simple, (seemingly) unilateral rule—the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. 51  But, with respect to some statutes, the Court has 
employed a multilateral approach. For example, in Lauritzen v. Larsen, the 
Court adopted a multilateral approach to determining the geographic 
scope of the Jones Act. The Court was very clear in conceptualizing the 
issue as one of geographic scope; as noted above, the Court stated that 
“we are simply dealing here with a question of statutory construction 
rather commonplace in a federal system.”52 Yet the approach it adopted 
to decide that question of statutory construction was a distinctly 
multilateral one, taking into account “considerations of comity, 
reciprocity, and long range interest” in order to “define the domain that 
each nation will claim as its own.”53 As described in Romero v. International 
Terminal Operating Co., the Lauritzen approach is based on “due recognition 
of our self-regarding respect for the relevant interests of foreign nations,” 
with “the controlling consideration [being] the interacting interests of the 
United States and foreign countries.”54  
The courts’ shifting approaches to the extraterritorial scope of the 
U.S. antitrust laws over the years further illustrate the point. In American 
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., the Supreme Court interpreted the Sherman 
Act to apply only when the conduct on which the suit was based took 
place on U.S. territory.55 In the Alcoa case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit later interpreted the statute to apply to conduct having 
an actual and intended effect on U.S. commerce. 56  Because Alcoa’s 
																																								 																				
51 The presumption against extraterritoriality is unilateral in that it does not require courts 
to take into account the interests of other states in the particular case. But, as noted in Part 
I, the presumption against extraterritoriality can be said to be multilateral in the sense that 
it is based on the desire to “protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those 
of other nations which could result in international discord.” Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248. As 
discussed in the next section, all geographic scope limitations are multilateral in the sense 
that they are based on deference to the legislative authority of other states or nations. 
52 Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 578. 
53 Id. at 582. 
54 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 383–84 (1958). 
55 American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357. 
56 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945) (en banc). 
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unilateral approach to the scope of the antitrust laws generated significant 
international friction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in 
the influential Timberlane decision, adopted a multilateral approach (which 
it called the “jurisdictional rule of reason”), asking “whether the interests 
of, and links to, the United States—including the magnitude of the effects 
on American foreign commerce—are sufficiently strong vis-à-vis those of 
other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority.”57 The 
Supreme Court later shifted to a hybrid approach,58 but the important 
point for present purposes is that each of these approaches— the 
multilateral approach of Timberlane no less than the unilateral approaches 
of American Banana and Alcoa—purported to address the geographic scope 
of the U.S. antitrust laws. 59  Thus, even though he emphatically 
understood that the issue before him was the geographic scope of the 
antitrust laws, Justice Scalia (the author of Morrison) had no trouble in 
Hartford Fire adopting the multilateral approach of the Third Restatement 
of Foreign Relations Law as the applicable rule.60 Justice Scalia was writing 
in dissent, but the majority in Hartford Fire, and later in Empagran, rejected 
the Timberlane approach not because it believed that geographic scope 
limitations must, by their nature, be governed by unilateral rules, but 
because it concluded that the Timberlane approach was too complex to be 
administrable.61 
Professor Kramer has recognized that the Court has at times 
adopted multilateral approaches to federal extraterritoriality. In a forceful 
critique of the Court’s revival of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, he described the earlier approaches in Lauritzen and 
Romero with approval.62 Even in the inter-state context, Professor Kramer 
has argued forcefully and persuasively that choice of law rules should be 
understood as geographic scope limitations. “[B]ecause choice of law is a 
process of interpreting laws to determine their applicability on the facts 
of a particular case, the forum can never ignore other states’ choice of law 
systems—whether these consist of ad hoc decisions, functional rules, or 
jurisdiction-selecting rules of the First Restatement variety. On the 
contrary, the applicability of another state’s law must be determined in 
																																								 																				
57 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Savs., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 
1976). 
58 See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164. 
59 The point was expressed forcefully by Justice Scalia in Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 800–
821 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (endorsing a multilateral approach). 
60 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 818–19 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
61 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 168. 
62 Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 S. 
Ct. Rev. 179, 195–96 (1991). He also discussed the multilateral approach of Timberlane 
without suggesting that this approach did not operate as a rule of scope. See id. at 193. 
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light of its choice of law system.”63 In Professor Kramer’s words “[a] 
state’s choice of law by definition establishes the state’s rules of 
interpretation for questions of extraterritorial scope.”64 
 Indeed, the term coined by Professor Kramer to describe the 
conclusion a court reaches at step one when it determines that the state 
has an interest in having its law applied supports the idea that step-two 
choice-of-law rules operate as geographic scope limitations. He describes 
the step-one inquiry as aimed at determining whether the state’s law is 
“prima facie applicable.”65 To say that a law is prima facie applicable is 
not to say that it is actually applicable.66 Rather, the term describes a 
tentative conclusion concerning the law’s applicability. Professor 
Kramer’s terminology suggests that step one leads to a tentative 
conclusion that a state’s law extends to the case, but, if another state’s law 
is also tentatively applicable, the determination that a state’s law is actually 
applicable is determined by the rules the state applies at step two to resolve 
the true conflict. Only if the step two inquiry results in the state’s law being 
applied instead of the law of other states whose laws are also prima facie 
applicable does the court reach the conclusion that the state’s law is actually 
applicable.  
When he directly addresses the nature of the choice of law rules 
applicable at step two, however, Professor Kramer concludes that they are 
not geographic scope limitations, but instead determine whether the 
state’s courts should decline to enforce a law of that state that is admittedly 
applicable to the case. This conceptualization is, of course, in conflict with 
the view expressed above regarding the role of a state’s courts in the legal 
system. As Professor Kramer himself notes, “[j]udges are, after all, agents 
of the states’ citizenry and law makers, and their paramount responsibility 
must be the implementation of the state’s own law.” 67  To be sure, 
Professor Kramer criticized Professor Currie’s reliance on this idea in 
concluding that the forum should always apply forum law in true conflict 
situations, but his criticism of Currie echoes Baxter’s and does not 
contradict the proposition that a state’s courts paramount responsibility is 
to resolve disputes in accordance with applicable forum law. Indeed, his 
critique of Professor Currie supports the conclusion that even step-two 
choice of law rules operate as geographic scope limitations. Thus, 
																																								 																				
63 Kramer, supra note 4, at 1005. 
64 Id. at 1011 (emphasis added). 
65 See id. at 1014. 
66 “Prima facie” means “based on the first impression; accepted as correct until proved 
otherwise.” See Prima facie, Google Dictionary, https://www.google.com/search?q= 
prima+facie+definition&oq=prima+facie&aqs=chrome.4.69i57j0l5.6047j0j1&sourceid= 
chrome&ie=UTF-8. 
67 Kramer, supra note 4, at 1015. 
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Professor Kramer notes that “the fact that another state’s law is also prima 
facie applicable (i.e., that there is a true conflict) is itself relevant in 
interpreting the law.”68 Indeed, “it hardly makes sense to presume that forum 
lawmakers want forum law enforced in every true conflict. Accordingly, 
absent a clear directive never to defer to other states, courts should not 
interpret forum law that way.”69 Here, Kramer appears to be acknowledging 
that a state’s approach to resolving true conflicts is itself a matter of 
interpretation of that state’s law.  
Notwithstanding these passages, Professor Kramer ultimately 
concludes that step-two choice of law rules are not geographic scope 
limitations even when they tell us that the relevant state’s courts would 
not apply its law in the particular case.70 This conclusion appears to be 
based on his firm conviction that sister states should be free to apply 
another state’s law, so long as it is “prima facie” applicable, even if the 
other state’s courts would not apply its own law when faced with a true 
conflict. The two-step theorists maintain that sister states are required to 
respect sister states’ geographic scope limitations. If a state’s law is subject 
to a geographic scope limitation, then, as a substantive matter, the law 
simply does not confer a right in cases falling outside its scope. Sister states 
would be misinterpreting that state’s law if they applied it to cases to which 
it is not applicable. Professor Kramer argues persuasively that the courts 
of one state should not be required to apply the rules another state’s courts 
apply at step two to resolve true conflicts, even if they would lead that 
state’s courts not to apply their own law. Having reached that conclusion, 
																																								 																				
68 Id. at 1016 (emphasis added).  
69 Id. at 1017 (emphasis added). 
70 When another state’s step-two rules lead to the conclusion that the state would apply its 
law to the particular case, the forum’s step-two rules function as rules of scope as well. If 
the forum’s step-two rules instruct the courts to apply forum law notwithstanding the fact 
that the other state’s law also extends to the case, it is deciding that forum law does extend 
to the case, and, pursuant to the principle that a state’s courts are agents of that state and 
are required to apply its law if applicable, the forum will apply forum law. One might argue 
that the forum would not be defying forum law if it entertains a cause of action under a 
sister state’s law under circumstances in which forum law would deny a cause of action. 
There is not necessarily a conflict between the absence of a cause of action under forum 
law and the existence of a cause of action under another state’s law. By analogy, when a 
plaintiff presents claims under both state and federal law, these are generally regarded as 
alternative causes of action, and the plaintiff is free to rely on both laws as alternative bases 
for relief. If a state were to take such an approach to sister state causes of action, however, 
it would be systematically favoring pro-recovery policies and systematically thwarting non-
recovery policies. For this reason, a state may well determine that its non-recovery law 
should prevail over another state’s pro-recovery law. At bottom, this too is a matter of 
interpretation of forum law. Just as a federal law denying a cause of action might be 
interpreted to preempt state laws conferring a cause of action, a state might interpret its law 
denying a cause of action as “preempting” causes of action under the laws of other states. 
The forum court’s treatment of this issue can be regarded as part of the forum’s step-two 
analysis. 
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Professor Kramer considers whether this conclusion is consistent with the 
view he had earlier defended that choice-of-law rules function as 
geographic scope limitations, and he finds no inconsistency because, 
whereas “most rules of interpretation are unilateral,” “[t]he rules for true 
conflicts are … multilateral in the sense that they look to the interests of 
other states as well.”71 They “purport to reflect an accommodation that, 
over the run of cases, is best for all states given their differing unilateral 
interests.” Thus, when a state decides not to apply its prima facie 
applicable law, “rather than saying that [it] has conferred no rights in this 
case, it is more accurate to say that [it] is willing to forego enforcing these 
rights and apply [the other state’s] law because [it] assumes that this is 
what [the other state] prefers.”72 
As discussed above, however, the fact that a rule is multilateral and 
takes into account the potential interests of other states in having their law 
applied to a particular case does not make that rule any less a geographic 
scope limitation. The federal extraterritoriality cases demonstrate as much, 
as does Professor Baxter’s analysis and, indeed, Professor Kramer’s own 
critique of Professor Currie’s forum preference. I agree entirely that states 
should be free to apply a sister state’s local law even if the sister state’s 
own courts, pursuant to a step-two analysis, would not apply their own 
law, and I agree that this is because of the nature of these choice-of-law 
rules—in particular that they reflect the state’s attempt to accommodate 
the interests of other states. But I draw a different conclusion from 
Professor Kramer’s analysis; rather than showing that step-two choice-of-
law rules operate any less as geographic scope restrictions than do step-
one rules, Professor Kramer’s analysis shows why other states should not 
be bound by either step-one or step-two rules. Step-two rules are not 
“unique.” As I argue in the next section, a state’s courts should not even 
be bound by sister states’ step one determinations that their laws are not 
“prima facie applicable.” The features of step-two rules that lead 
Professor Kramer to conclude that step-two determinations of non-
applicability are not binding on sister states apply equally to step-one 
determinations, and, indeed, to all choice-of-law rules, even geographic 
scope limitations expressly incorporated into substantive statutes.  
The next section explains why step-one rules should not be 
binding on sister state courts any more than step-two rules. The final Part 
of this Chapter considers whether it follows from this argument, as 
Professor Kramer appears to believe, that neither category of rules 
operates to limit the substantive law’s geographic reach.  
																																								 																				
71 Kramer, supra note 4, at 1033. 
72 Id. at 1034. 
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3.2 Are Step-One Limitations Binding on Other States? 
If I am right in concluding that all choice of law rules function 
equally as geographic scope limitations, then the two-step theory would 
require courts to engage in renvoi much more broadly than the two-step 
theorists recognize. The forum would have to apply the other states’ step-
two rules, as well as any hybrid rules, to ensure that the other states’ local 
laws extend to the case. If the laws do not extend to the case, the two-step 
theory insists that the courts of other states are not free to apply them to 
the case. The two-step theorists argue that only the step-one rules are 
binding on other states. According to Professor Kramer, step-two rules 
(and hybrid rules such as those of the First and Second Restatements) are 
not binding on other states because of “the unique nature of the second-
order rules for solving true conflicts,” by which he means that these rules 
are multilateral rather than unilateral and that they “purport to reflect an 
accommodation that, over the run of cases, is best for all states given their 
differing unilateral interests.”73 In this section, I argue that even step-one 
rules are “multilateral” in the relevant sense, and that both step-one and 
step-two rules differ from internal scope limitations in a way that warrants 
the conclusion that, unlike internal scope restrictions, neither rules are 
binding on the courts of other states.  
According to the two-step theory, determining the geographic 
scope of a statute is no different from determining the statute’s internal 
scope.74 Both scope questions are a matter of statutory interpretation. A 
court interpreting a statute to determine its applicability to cases having 
connections to other states is engaged in the same enterprise as a court 
interpreting a statute to determine its applicability to certain marginal 
domestic situations. Just as a court must interpret a statute to determine 
whether it applies to persons under 18 years of age, a court must interpret 
a statute to determine if it applies to a case in which some of the relevant 
conduct took place in another state. Most importantly for present 
purposes, two-step theorists maintain that a court’s determination that a 
statute does not apply to a dispute having certain foreign elements is an 
authoritative interpretation of the statute, binding on the courts of other 
states. It is no less of an error for the courts of a sister state to apply 
another state’s local law to an inter-state dispute to which it does not 
extend than it is to apply a statute that applies only to persons over 18 
years of age to a person under 18 years of age.  
																																								 																				
73 Id. at 1033. 
74 I use the term “geographic scope limitation” to include limits a state places on the persons 
to which its law extends when those limits are based on the persons’ lack of ties to the state. 
On the other hand, a provision limiting the scope of the law to certain categories of persons 
domiciled in the state (such as those under 18 years of age) is an internal scope limitation. 
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This analysis misses an important difference between geographic 
scope limitations and internal scope limitations. Internal scope limitations 
reflect the law-maker’s determination that a particular substantive rule is 
appropriate for persons or conduct within the statute’s scope but 
inappropriate for persons or conduct outside its scope. If a legislature 
enacts a substantive rule but limits its applicability to persons who are over 
18 years of age, the scope limitation reflects the judgment that the rule is 
not appropriate for persons under 18. Persons under 18 years of age 
remain subject to a different rule or regulatory regime of that same state. 
Similarly, if a legislature enacts a substantive rule and specifies that it is 
applicable to conduct occurring in parks, the scope limitation reflects a 
judgment that the rule is inappropriate for conduct occurring in spaces 
that are not parks. Conduct outside parks is governed by different rules 
of that state. If another state’s courts purport to be applying the enacting 
state’s law but do not give effect to an internal scope limitation, they are 
misapplying the enacting state’s law.  
Geographic scope limitations, by contrast, do not necessarily 
reflect a determination that the substantive rule is inappropriate for 
persons or situations that fall outside the law’s scope.75 Geographic scope 
limitations ordinarily reflect the state’s forbearance from applying its 
substantive rule to disputes that other states might have a stronger claim 
to regulate. Geographic scope limitations, in other words, ordinarily 
reflect comity concerns. The scope limitation may reflect the state’s 
willingness to entertain the possibility that its local law may not be well-
suited for disputes having closer connections to states having different 
values, traditions, social structures, levels of development, topographic 
characteristics, etc. Or the state may regard its substantive rule to be 
substantively superior and appropriate for persons or situations having 
substantial connections to other states but be willing to defer to another 
state’s potentially stronger claim to legislate with respect to the particular 
matter.76 In either case, the geographic scope limitation reflects, at most, 
agnosticism about whether its law should be applied beyond the specified 
scope. In the case of internal scope limitations, on the other hand, the 
																																								 																				
75 In this section, I will assume that the rules we are discussing are geographic scope 
limitations. (Indeed, my analysis here applies to statutory provisions expressly framed as 
geographic scope limitations, as well as choice of law rules that have long been thought to 
function as implicit geographic scope limitations.) In the next section, I will consider 
whether a limitation that is binding on the enacting state’s courts but not the courts of other 
states can properly be considered a scope limitation at all. 
76 To say that the scope limitations reflected in choice-of-law rules are based on comity 
concerns does not mean that states necessarily adopt them out of a sense of altruism. It is 
possible that states adhere to these limits in the self-interested hope that sister states will 
adhere to similar limitations when the shoe is on the other foot. See Romero, supra text 
accompanying note 54. My argument does not depend on the claim that states adhere to 
these limitations out of a sense of altruism. 
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legislature has plenary, uncontested legislative authority, yet it chooses to 
limit the statute’s scope to certain types of persons or spaces or situations, 
leaving disputes involving other persons, places, or situations to be 
governed by a different law of that state. A geographic scope limitation does 
not necessarily reflect the view that cases falling outside the law’s 
geographic scope should be governed by a different rule. Indeed, the 
enacting state does not provide another rule to govern such cases.  
If State A enacts a substantive rule and engrafts geographic scope 
limitations to it for reasons of comity, it is not expressing an affirmative 
preference that the rule not be applied to disputes falling outside the rule’s 
scope. It may indeed prefer that the rule also be applied to disputes falling 
outside the rule’s scope. Thus, if the limitation was enacted for reasons of 
deference, State A would not be offended or in any way disrespected by 
State B if State B’s courts decided that deference to State B was not 
necessary and went ahead and applied State A’s local law.  
Professor Kramer maintains that, unlike step-two rules, step-one 
rules do not reflect the enacting state’s accommodation of the competing 
interests of other states or nations. If a step-one analysis reveals that the 
enacting state has no interest in applying its law to the case in the first 
place, there is no need to accommodate its own interests to those of other 
states. But this argument reflects a too-narrow understanding of a state’s 
possible interest in having its law applied. A state’s local law reflects that 
state’s lawmakers’ views of the optimal substantive standards for resolving 
disputes of the relevant type. It is presumably for that reason that the state 
has adopted the substantive rule to resolve disputes having no out-of-state 
contacts. In cases pending before its courts, the enacting state therefore 
may have a residual interest in having its law applied to cases having out-
of-state elements: its interest, as a justice-administering state, in resolving 
the dispute according to the rule that its lawmakers have determined is the 
“best” rule for the type of case involved.77 Applying forum law can also 
be expected to ease the burden on its courts, as forum law will be more 
familiar to forum courts than another state’s law.78  
																																								 																				
77 Professor Singer relies on this interest in urging a presumption of forum law. See Singer, 
supra note 37, at 83. This interest is also recognized by Professor Leflar’s “better law” 
approach. Professor Brilmayer advances a version of this argument in her critique of interest 
analysis. She posits a legislature controlled by consumer advocates that enacts a consumer-
protective law in order to benefit consumers worldwide. See Brilmayer, supra note 32. 
78 See Elliott E. Cheatham and Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Colum. 
L. Rev. 959, 964 (1952) (“Obviously, a court is most familiar with its own local law. It should 
not assume the burden of ascertaining and applying that of another state without good 
reason. And the greater the burden involved, the more compelling must be reason for 
assuming it. This policy is basic to choice of law.”). 
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Of course, that interest might be overcome in a particular case 
having foreign elements. To recognize that a state always has a residual 
interest in having the dispute resolved according to what its lawmakers 
regard as the “best” local law does not dictate what weight this interest 
should have in the choice-of-law analysis. Because all states may be said 
to have this interest, the enacting state’s interest in having its law applied 
will (arguably) always be cancelled out by the interest of other states 
connected to the dispute in having their laws applied, if the other state has 
a different substantive law. Thus, taking this interest into account in the 
choice-of-law process may in the end not be very helpful in resolving a 
choice-of-law problem.79 For this reason, a state may well adopt a choice-
of-law approach under which this sort of interest is always trumped by the 
sort of interest that two-step theorists would find in step one. Recognizing 
this interest therefore may not produce a different outcome for two-step 
theorists (apart from the renvoi question). Nevertheless, it remains true 
that, for a state that adopts the two-step approach and finds in the 
particular case that only one state has an interest in applying its law (as the 
two-step theorists define such interests), the step-one analysis is actually 
functioning as a “rule of priority” because the court is implicitly holding 
that the sort of interest the two-step theorists find determinative should 
prevail over another state’s residual interest in having the dispute resolved 
according to the local law with which its courts are most familiar and its 
lawmakers regard as best.  
If we take into account that states have these residual interests, 
then every decision not to extend that law to an inter-state or international 
case reflects the state’s subordination of these residual interests. If the 
state’s geographic scope limitations reflect a subordination of the state’s 
interest in resolving the dispute according to the best or most familiar law 
(as well as other interests the state may have) out of deference to the 
potential interest of other states in regulating the matter, then the scope 
limitation does not reflect an affirmative preference that other states not 
apply its substantive law. The situation thus fits Professor Kramer’s 
description of the type of case in which he thinks it is not necessary for a 
state’s courts to follow a sister state’s decision not apply its own law: As 
he describes it, the step-two analysis calls to mind 
Dean Griswold’s image of Alphonse and Gaston politely deferring 
to each other and never getting through the door. Like the two 
comic characters, [the two states] defer to each other not because 
neither wants to enter (i.e., not because they have no interest), but 
																																								 																				
79 Some scholars would give this interest considerable weight, however. See Singer, supra 
note 37; Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 
Calif. L. Rev. 1584, 1585 (1966). 
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because each believes the other would or should prefer to go first. 
Once Alphonse makes sure that Gaston is wrong and that he 
(Alphonse) genuinely prefers to see Gaston go first, he should 
escort Gaston through the door.80 
Similarly, if the forum state is convinced that, under the preferable choice 
of law rule, its sister state’s law should be applied, it should not be deterred 
from applying it out of deference to its sister state’s deference-based scope 
limitation.  
I have so far been assuming that a state’s geographic scope 
limitations are based on comity. It is, of course, possible that a given state’s 
scope limitation is not based on comity. A state might instead choose to 
limit the scope of its law in order to restrict the benefit of its better law to 
domiciliaries, or to externalize the costs of its law to out-of-staters. (We 
might call these “protectionist” interests.) If the geographic scope 
limitation reflects these sorts of interests, the enacting state may well 
prefer that its law not be applied beyond its specified scope. 81  But 
geographic scope limitations motivated by such aims are not ones that 
other states or nations should feel obligated to respect. Ordinarily, another 
country would simply decide to apply its own law instead or would decline 
to entertain a cause of action designed to disadvantage its own nationals. 
In the inter-state context, scope limitations of this sort would in many 
cases be unconstitutional. As Professor Kramer has recognized, if a state 
has limited the benefits of its own law to state residents or domiciliaries, 
the restriction is valid when it serves a “substantial nonprotectionist 
objective.”82 In his view, scope restrictions that limit the benefit of state 
laws to residents are generally permissible when “the justification for 
limiting the scope of [such] laws … is comity.”83 In such cases, the scope 
limitation “is a means of accommodating the interests of other states,”84 
which is permissible because “reducing interstate friction is the central 
purpose of the privileges and immunities clause.”85 Thus, “[a] state may 
withhold the benefits of its law [from nonresidents] in order to apply the 
																																								 																				
80 Kramer, supra note 4, at 1034 (footnote omitted). 
81 Even this is questionable, however, as the enacting state does not purport to be enacting 
a different rule for disputes beyond the local law’s specified scope. Instead, it leaves disputes 
beyond the law’s geographic scope to be addressed under the laws of other states, which 
might indeed adopt the same substantive law for the case at hand. Presumably, the enacting 
state does not provide a different law to govern disputes beyond its local law’s scope 
because it doubts its legislative authority over such cases. Thus, even here, the geographic 
scope limitation may be said to reflect comity concerns. 
82 Kramer, supra note 6, at 1067. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 1067–68. 
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law of another interested state, but not otherwise.”86 If comity is the only 
legitimate reason for limiting the geographic reach of a state’s local law, 
states would be warranted in presuming that a sister state’s geographic 
scope limitations do not reflect a preference that the enacting state’s local 
law not be applied beyond the specified scope.87  
It is also possible that a state’s geographic scope limitation is not 
entirely based on comity or entirely based on protectionism or 
discrimination against out-of-staters or other illegitimate purposes. For 
example, a state might decide to limit the scope of its law primarily for 
reasons of deference to other states, but its selection of a particular scope 
limitation might reflect other legitimate purposes as well. If a state’s sole 
purpose in limiting the scope of its law is deference to other states’ 
superior legislative authority, one might expect it to adopt a scope 
limitation along the lines of the Second Restatement’s “more significant 
relationship” test or Timberlane’s jurisdictional rule of reason. In other 
words, the state’s choice-of-law rule might provide in open-ended terms 
that its substantive law applies to cases having foreign elements unless, in 
light of the facts of the case and other relevant considerations, another 
state has a stronger claim to having its law applied. But the state might 
also be concerned that such an approach is too complex for judicial 
administration, and for this reason it might choose a more streamlined 
rule. (This was, indeed, the reason the Court gave in Empagran for rejecting 
the Timberlane approach.)88 If so, then the state’s reasons for selecting the 
																																								 																				
86 Id. at 1068. This analysis leads Professor Kramer to conclude that scope limitations that 
limit the benefits of a state’s law to residents are constitutional in true and false conflict 
situations. In both of those contexts, if the forum decides not to apply its law to benefit 
nonresidents, it is doing so in order to defer to another state’s interest in applying its own 
law to its residents. See id. at 1068–72. In unprovided-for cases, however, such a scope 
limitation would violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause because the comity-based 
justification for denying the nonresident the benefit of the law would be inapplicable. As 
Professor Kramer argues, “[t]o the extent that the reason for treating nonresidents 
differently is comity, there must be another state that wants to treat the nonresident 
differently.” Id. at 1068. In unprovided-for cases, by hypothesis, the other interested states 
do not have an interest in having their law applied. 
87 My analysis in this essay suggests that Professor Kramer’s view of when another state has 
an interest in having its law applied may be too narrow. If, as I argued above, a state always 
has a residual interest in resolving the dispute according to the law its lawmakers have 
determined is best, then a state having a different substantive law than the forum’s will 
always be an interested state. But the point here is that, to the extent such a state declines 
nevertheless to extend its law to cases having foreign elements, its only legitimate reason 
for doing so is deference to the legislative authority of another state. If deference is the 
reason for the limitation, then the limitation does not reflect an affirmative preference that 
the law not be applied. Other states should not feel constrained to accept the other state’s 
deference to it. 
88  The Court said the Timberlane approach was “too complex to prove workable.” 
Empagran, 542 U.S. at 168. As the Court explained, “[t]he legally and economically technical 
nature of that enterprise means lengthier proceedings, appeals, and more proceedings to 
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particular scope limitation it selected would reflect a combination of its 
desire to defer to other states’ lawmaking authorities in appropriate cases 
and a desire to simplify the judicial task. 
If a state’s scope limitation reflects this combination of interests, 
however, it is unlikely to reflect an affirmative desire that other states 
apply the scope limitation. A state that adopts such a scope limitation 
(even if it expressly incorporates it into the substantive statute) would 
likely have preferred to apply its substantive law more broadly, but it 
declined to do so for comity reasons. It could have accomplished its 
comity goals by adopting an all-things-considered balancing test, but it 
declined to do so in order to ease the administrative burden on the courts. 
This ease-of-administration goal would appear to be implicated only when 
the dispute is being adjudicated in that state’s courts. If another state is 
not similarly concerned about burdening its courts with a complex, all-
things-considered balancing process and consequently adopts a Second 
Restatement-type approach, it may well conclude that the enacting state 
has the most significant relationship to the dispute and that its law should 
therefore be applied even if the enacting state’s courts would not apply it. 
It seems to follow that, if the forum were to apply its sister state’s local 
law but disregard its hybrid geographic scope limitation, it would not be 
disrespecting the enacting state’s preferences. We can assume that the 
enacting state’s preference was that its local law be applied whenever it 
had the superior claim to regulate the matter, but that it subordinated that 
preference to a desire to simplify the job of its own courts.89  
A geographic scope limitation might also reflect a combination of 
comity concerns and a desire to provide regulated parties with a greater 
degree of certainty and predictability about the applicable law than would 
be provided by an all-things-considered approach such as that of the 
Second Restatement. (This appears to be the aim of the draft Third 
Restatement.) Whether a sister state would be disrespecting such a state’s 
preferences were it to apply its substantive law to disputes falling outside 
the scope of the law, as determined by the terms of the scope limitation, 
presents a more complex question—one beyond the scope of this 
Chapter.90 My analysis so far should suffice to establish that a geographic 
																																								 																				
the point where procedural costs and delays could themselves threaten interference with a 
foreign nations’ ability to maintain the integrity of its own antitrust enforcement system.” 
Id. at 168–69. 
89 The judicial administration concern underlying the scope limitation is thus akin to a 
procedural concern. Like other procedural rules, it should apply only if the adjudication is 
pending in the enacting state’s courts. 
90 My tentative view is that this sort of hybrid scope limitation should also not be binding 
on sister state courts. The interest in certainty and predictability may, of course, be relevant 
to the constitutional analysis. Thus, to apply a criminal statute beyond its geographic scope 
as reflected in an express statutory scope limitation is likely unconstitutional. Even in civil 
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scope limitation (even an express geographic scope limitation 
incorporated into the text of a statute) should not always bind the courts 
of sister states. Some such limitations will be unconstitutional (in the inter-
state context) or in any event undeserving of the respect of sister states or 
foreign nations because they are discriminatory or protectionist. If based 
on comity, scope limitations do not express a preference that other states 
adhere to them. If they reflect a combination of deference to other states 
and another valid concern, the other valid concern may not extend to 
cases being litigated in the courts of other states. 
4 Choice-of-Law Rules as Geographic Scope Limitations Redux  
Does the conclusion that a choice-of-law rule is not binding on the 
courts of other states mean that the rule is not really a geographic scope 
limitation? Professor Kramer concluded that step-two rules were not 
geographic scope limitations because they are not binding on the courts 
of other states. In his view, to say that a given state’s law does not extend 
to this case because of a geographic scope limitation means that the law 
“confer[s] no rights in this case.”91 If a law confers no rights, then it 
cannot be the basis for a judicial decision in favor of the plaintiff. Thus, if 
another state has determined that the enacting state’s law governs the case, 
it would be required to dismiss on the ground that the law does not confer 
a right on the plaintiff. If sister states are free to apply the underlying local 
law without regard to step-two rules (and, if my argument in section 3 is 
right, at least some step-one limitations), then such rules do not in fact 
operate as geographic scope limitations.  
There is some appeal to that view. To say that these rules limit the 
geographic scope of a law does seem to mean that the law simply does 
not extend to disputes beyond its scope, which in turn seems to mean 
that, regardless of the forum, the law does not confer substantive rights 
to the parties or otherwise apply to such cases. If so, then my claim that 
sister states may properly apply that law to disputes beyond its scope 
seems tantamount to a conclusion that these provisions do not really 
function as geographic scope limitations. If my analysis is correct, then 
even express statutory language purporting to limit the geographic reach 
																																								 																				
cases, constitutional doctrine requires consideration of whether application of a state’s law 
would be “arbitrary [or] fundamentally unfair,” see Allstate Ins. Co., 449 U.S. at 312, which 
in turn makes relevant whether the parties could have anticipated application of that state’s 
law. See id. at 317 (noting that defendant “can hardly claim unfamiliarity with the laws of 
the host jurisdiction and surprise that the state courts might apply forum law …”) Within 
these constitutional limits, however, a state should be free to weigh the interest in certainty 
and predictability differently than do their sister states and accordingly to apply their sister 
states’ laws beyond their geographic scope as specified in a scope limitation or inferred from 
the enacting states’ choice of law rules. 
91 Kramer, supra note 4, at 1033. 
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of a statute does not actually operate to limit the reach of the statute (to 
the extent the provision is based on comity). The statutory text binds the 
enacting state’s courts, but it does not purport to bind other states, which 
remain free to apply the substantive law more broadly.  
Admittedly, the idea of a limitation on the substantive scope of a 
law that varies depending on the forum is elusive. There would appear to 
be (at least) two other possible conceptualizations compatible with my 
thesis that the courts of other states are free to apply such laws even when 
the courts of the enacting state would not. First, one can understand a 
state’s local law as conferring a right even when that state’s courts would 
not apply it because of step-one or step-two rules, or, indeed, because of 
express statutory restrictions on the scope of a state’s law. On this view, 
the step-one and step-two rules, as well as express statutory scope 
limitations, would operate as instructions to the local courts to forego 
application of otherwise applicable law in order to accommodate the 
interests of other states. These rules would still be binding on the enacting 
state’s courts, but they would not operate as substantive limits on the 
scope of the state’s law. They would operate instead as a sort of procedural 
instruction to the courts of the enacting states, but would not purport to 
bind the courts of other states. So conceptualized, the rules would not 
function as scope limitations at all.  
This would appear to be a natural way to conceptualize choice of 
law rules enacted by the legislature in a general choice-of-law statute. Such 
statutes are rare in the United States, but are common in the rest of the 
world, where choice of law rules form part of the Civil Code.92 Such rules 
do not purport to be limitations on the substantive scope of the enacting 
state’s laws, and can easily be understood as instructions from the state’s 
legislature to the state’s courts regarding the circumstances in which it is 
																																								 																				
92 See, e.g., CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 105(I) (Braz.), Zhonghua 
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BGBl 1 at 2494 (Ger.), Legge 31 maggio 1995, n. 218, G.U. Jun 3, 1995, Suppl. Ordinario 
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31-1917, últimas reformas DOF 10-02-2014 (Mex.). 
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proper for forum courts to refrain from applying forum law. This 
conceptualization is also more consistent with another aspect of such 
statutes: they not only instruct the state’s courts not to apply forum law in 
some cases, but they also instruct the court to apply the local law of 
another state or nation. For example, the Rome II regulations of the 
European Union instructs member states to apply the law of the place of 
injury to tort cases (subject to certain exceptions) and expressly prohibit 
renvoi.93 By requiring application of another state’s law without regard to 
whether the other state’s law would be applicable under its choice of law 
rules, the regulations appear to conceptualize choice-of-law rules as 
something other than limitations on the law’s substantive scope.  
To be sure, this conceptualization is in tension with how choice-
of-law rules have been thought to operate in common law systems lacking 
general choice-of-law statutes. As the Carroll case illustrates, the courts 
have generally reconciled the application of such rules with the judicial 
obligation to apply statutes enacted by the legislature by conceptualizing 
such rules as implicit limitations on geographic scope. Federal 
extraterritoriality doctrine is similarly well understood to be “a matter of 
statutory construction” regarding the territorial reach of federal law. As 
discussed, this conceptualization has been the basis for reconciling such 
rules with the court’s obligation to resolve disputes in accordance with 
applicable forum state law. The court assumes that the legislature did not 
mean to resolve the geographic scope question.  
But the latter problem can be addressed through a slight 
reconceptualization of the issue. The courts can assume instead that the 
legislature meant to leave open a slightly different question: not whether 
the law extends to cases having foreign elements, but whether the forum’s 
courts should apply it to such cases. Choice-of-law rules can be 
understood as a presumptive caveat to the forum courts about their 
obligation to apply forum law to cases having foreign elements. The 
reasons that have been thought to justify the court’s articulation and 
application of these “background rules of interpretation” to determine the 
statute’s geographic scope equally justify their articulation and application 
as presumptive instructions to forum courts not to apply otherwise 
applicable law to cases having foreign elements.  
The proposed reconceptualization of choice of law rules as merely 
instructions to the forum courts to refrain from applying laws that are in 
principle universally applicable is perhaps most difficult to accept with 
respect to statutory provisions expressly written as geographic scope 
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July 2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L 
199) 40, arts. 4, 24 (EC). 
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limitations.94 If my analysis in Part 3 is sound, these limitations too should 
be no more binding on the courts of other states than are other choice-
of-law rules (at least to the extent they are based on comity concerns). The 
reconceptualization is justified because, to the extent the limitations are 
based on comity, they do not reflect the enacting state’s affirmative desire 
that other states not apply its law. The reconceptualization would 
admittedly be in tension with the text of these laws, but if the courts are 
justified in reading a scope limitation into a law that is written in universal 
terms, then they would seem to be justified in reading a clause that is 
written as a geographic limit as instead an instruction to forum courts to 
decline to enforce the substance of the law to the specified cases. 95 
Admittedly, however, asking the courts to treat an express geographic 
scope limitation as something other than a geographic scope limitation 
may be a bridge too far. 
The other possible conceptualization would treat all of these rules 
as geographic scope limitations but reconceptualize what the courts of 
other states are doing when they apply the local law of another state to 
cases beyond that law’s geographic scope. On this view, the enacting 
state’s law does not apply ex proprio vigore to cases beyond its geographic 
scope as specified in an express statutory scope limitation as or inferred 
from step-one or step-two rules, but other states would be free to resolve 
cases according to the local law of the enacting state even when the law 
does not reach the dispute of its own force. When it does this, we might 
say that the court is incorporating the substantive rule of another state’s 
local law as its own for purposes of deciding the case. This 
conceptualization resembles the once fashionable but now much derided 
“local law” theory of choice of law, under which a state that decides to 
resolve a dispute under the law of another state is understood to have 
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incorporated that law as its own law for purposes of that case.96 But the 
conceptualization being considered here does not go that far. The “local 
law” theory posits that the forum is always incorporating another state’s 
law as its own. The reconceptualization being considered here would 
require this understanding of what a court is doing when it applies another 
state’s law only when the enacting state’s law does not purport to apply. 
If the enacting state’s courts would apply its own law, then a sister state 
that decides to resolve the case according to the enacting state’s law could 
be said to be applying that law qua sister state law.  
In the inter-state context, a constitutional issue might arise if the 
forum does not have enough contacts to the dispute to permit it to apply 
its own law. By hypothesis, the enacting state’s law does not reach the case 
because of the geographic scope limitation. If the forum does not have 
enough contacts to apply its own law, can it apply its sister state’s (by 
hypothesis inapplicable) local law qua its own law? A full analysis of this 
issue is beyond the scope of this Chapter, but the analysis in Part 3 
suggests that doing so should not be deemed a violation of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause. If I am right that geographic scope limitations do not 
reflect the enacting state’s affirmative desire that the dispute not be 
resolved according to its local law, then the forum would not be 
disrespecting the enacting state’s wishes if it resolve the case according to 
its local law even if the enacting state’s courts would not. But perhaps it 
would be a violation of the Due Process Clause, which imposes similar 
limits on a state’s ability to extend its own law extraterritorially.  
As between these two alternative conceptualizations, the first 
would involve a greater departure from current understandings of the 
choice-of-law process and federal extraterritoriality doctrine, and it would 
require a radical departure from the text of comity-based statutory scope 
limitations. But it would accord with the rationale for these limitations 
(which would no longer be understood as scope limitations). It would also 
bring the U.S. conceptualization of the choice of law rules closer to how 
these rules are understood in the civil law world. And it would more 
elegantly avoid the constitutional issues just discussed.  
In any event, whether we regard these provisions as a special type 
of scope limitation or as not geographic scope limitations at all, this 
Chapter’s analysis, if correct, establishes that the characterization applies 
to all choice-of-law rules, not just those that are applied to resolve true 
conflicts. Indeed, the characterization also applies to express statutory 
provisions purporting to limit the applicability of the enacting state’s 
substantive law to cases having certain connections to the enacting state 
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(to the extent that they reflect comity concerns). Insofar as these 
provisions call for non-application of the enacting state’s substantive law, 
they are binding on the enacting state’s courts, but they are not binding 
on the courts of other states. The two-step theorists, and the current draft 
of the Third Restatement, are right to conclude that step-two rules are not 
binding on the courts of other states, but they are wrong to insist that 
step-one rules are binding on other states. Even express statutory 
limitations on a statute’s geographic scope may be disregarded by the 
courts of sister states to the extent they are based on deference to other 
states (or if they reflect protectionist or discriminatory purposes). 
 
